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Abstract:  
 
 
This study explores a diversity-innovation relationship in state legislatures. The research 
includes three measures of diversity: occupational, gender, and racial diversity. The 
author uses two measures to capture diversity: a USA Today Diversity Index formula and 
the proportion of legislators that do not belong to the majority subgroup. To explore 
innovation, the author exploits the policy reinvention stage of the policy innovation and 
diffusion process. Innovation in policy reinvention is measured with cosine similarity, 
arguing that greater originality in policy reinvention represents a greater display of 
innovation. The study finds that as the gender diversity of a state legislature increases, the 
legislature displays greater innovation through an increased use of original language in 
policy reinvention. These findings add to our current understanding of descriptive 
representation, indicating that symbolic representation provides greater substantive 
benefits than previously thought. Additionally, these findings expand our understanding 
of policy reinvention, by demonstrating legislature diversity has an impact on a 
legislature’s ability to innovate on behalf of constituents.
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“Strength lies in differences, not similarities.” 
-Stephen R. Covey 
 
A diverse group of voices in a legislative body is necessary to produce the ideal form of 
representative government described by John Stuart Mill in the mid-1800s. Nearly two centuries 
later, a major charge against state legislatures is their occupational, racial, and gender 
homogeneity.  When people consider what a state legislator looks like, often, the mental image is 
of a White, college-educated, Protestant, male.  Although this image is easily associated with the 
state legislators of most states, according to Kurtz (2015) with the National Conference of State 
Legislatures, state legislatures, although less diverse than their constituencies, are more diverse 
than ever before. 
Currently, we understand diversity in state legislatures to affect legislative agenda setting.  
Through an analysis of proposed legislation in six state legislatures, Bratton (2002) examined the 
relationship between racial/gender diversity and agenda setting. Bratton (2002) finds that as 
gender diversity increased in the Democratic Party, the number of proposed women’s interest
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measures1 increased. As racial diversity increases, Bratton (2002) observed White legislators 
introducing fewer Black interest measures2 and Black legislators placing more Black interest 
measures on the agenda.    
Additionally, the effects of diversity in the private sector are well-documented. 
According to Lorenzo et al. (2017), who examine diversity’s potential impact in business, the top 
twenty-five percent of companies in racial diversity are thirty-five percent more likely to generate 
greater innovation revenue than the average company, while the top twenty-five percent of 
companies in gender diversity are fifteen percent more likely to have higher innovation revenues 
than the average company. Furthermore, Hunt (2015) finds that the bottom twenty-five percent of 
companies in racial and gender diversity are less likely to outperform the average company. 
Companies around the globe reap the benefits of diversity, seeing innovation revenue3 increase 
when diversity is present (Lorenzo et al. 2017). It remains to be seen, however, whether these 
findings are transferrable to state legislatures. Drawing from Bratton (2002) and Lorenzo et al. 
(2017), I further explore of how diversity influences political processes. Specifically, by using 
occupational, racial, and gender diversity measures for forty-seven state legislatures, I examine 
how diversity impacts a legislature’s capacity to use original language when reinventing policy 
adopted from another state.   
To measure state legislature innovation, I exploit the policy reinvention stage of the 
policy diffusion process.  Policy diffusion is the process of a policy spreading to policy adopters.  
                                                           
1 Bratton (2002) categorizes a measure as a women’s interest measure if the proposed measure attempts 
to substantively address gender discrimination, alleviate the effects of gender discrimination, or improve 
the socioeconomic status of women.  An example of a woman’s interest measure is an Equal Pay law. 
2 Similarly, Bratton (2002) categorize a proposed bill as a Black interest bill, whenever the proposed 
legislation attempts to substantively address racial discrimination, mediates the effects of racial 
discrimination, or increases the socioeconomic status of African Americans.  An example of a bill coded as 
a Black interest bill is proposed legislation that encourages the integration of the education system. 
3 Innovation revenue is defined by Lorenzo et al. (2017) as “the share of revenues that companies have 
generated from enhanced or entirely new products or services in the most recent three-year period”. 
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When implementing another state’s policy, adopters adapt a policy to fit the needs of their state 
and constituents.  In an ideal situation, adopting a policy without adapting it to the needs of a state 
indicates the legislature did not need to alter a policy before adoption. However, in a worst-case 
scenario, not changing a policy upon adoption indicates lazy lawmaking and a missed opportunity 
to innovate in order to best serve constituents.  Further, it is thought that policies incrementally 
become more comprehensive over time, as states learn from the policy successes and failures of 
other states (Mooney and Lee 1999). A lack of innovation in policy reinvention can prevent the 
policy from incrementally changing and becoming more comprehensive over time. 
By using diversity to explain variability in policy diffusion and policy reinvention, a new 
avenue of research is revealed. This group-centered approach investigates the effects of diverse 
groups in state legislatures. This study reveals that the legislators, themselves, play a role in 
determining the amount of change a legislature performs to a policy upon reinvention. The 
legislators, as a collective group, are critical to explaining policy reinvention, because diversity 
can be a driver of innovation. Diverse collections of people contain the potential to unlock 
innovation, because they have a larger pool of experiences, knowledge, and expertise, derived 
from distinct group-experiences and cultural dissimilarity (Janssens and Zanoni 2005), to draw 
upon when debating solutions to a problem (van Kippenberg and Hoever 2017). In the context of 
a state legislature, diverse groups provide distinct voices in the deliberative process. 
The deliberative process is the political mechanism by which diversity creates a larger 
capacity in a legislature for innovation. During the deliberation over a policy, differences between 
legislators expand the discussion of solutions and consequences. The logic is elegant in its 
simplicity: the more diverse the perspectives in deliberation, the greater the likelihood of 
addressing the potential issues, such as conflictual constituent preferences, conflictual state laws, 
or conflictual state agency enabling legislation, of a policy proposal. Determining which 
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measures of diversity and which mediating factors, in the context of a legislature, unlock 
diversity’s potential for innovation remains unexplored.   
I add to the current empirical understanding of the characteristics affecting a legislature’s 
capacity for policy reinvention, which is described by Glick and Hays (1991) as being driven, at 
least partially, by innovation. I measure the innovativeness of policy reinvention by conducting a 
textual analysis of state policies using cosine similarity, which measures the amount of similarity 
between two document vectors, arguing that significant changes in the reinvention of a policy 
display legislative innovation. The most similar-previously passed legislation acts as a control or 
baseline for measuring subsequent changes in the reinvention process.  Further, I enhance the 
understanding of policy innovation, diffusion, and reinvention by presenting evidence that the 
composition of state legislatures also has a role in determining the level of innovativeness in the 
reinvention process.   
By developing a fuller understanding of a legislature’s capacity to reinvent policy, this 
study more than explores the factors that explain why some legislatures borrow language from 
previous policy adopters and other states use original language.  Through empirically showing 
voters that the composition of their state legislature influences the legislature’s capacity for 
reinventing public policy, the findings of this study provide voters additional, constructive 
information for selecting elected representatives. Reform-minded individuals may also use the 
findings of this research to add credence to the notion that diversity matters, especially when 
considering political representation. The following section displays policy diffusion and policy 
reinvention scholarship and concludes by addressing the factors contributing to the diversity-
innovation relationship. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
The seminal work of Rogers (1962) began the study of policy diffusion. The policy 
diffusion process is as follows: the initial state to implement a policy is known as a policy 
innovator. The states that ‘follow-the-leader’ are the adopters of a policy. The process of 
subsequent innovation and adoption is referred to as policy diffusion (Walker 1969; Rogers 1962; 
Rogers 1990). According to Rogers (2010), diffusion is described as “the process by which 
innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social 
system” (5). Essentially, states do not create laws in a vacuum. States are in positions within a 
social system to learn from the policy successes and failures of other states. 
Initially, studies of policy diffusion centered on the subsequent adoption of a policy, with 
little concern to the changing of policy over time. Over the last three decades, however, scholars 
began looking at the changes a legislature performs to policies upon adoption, through a process 
known as policy reinvention (Mooney and Lee 1999; Jansa, Hansen, Gray 2018).  Specifically, 
policy reinvention is the process of modifying policy to fit the needs of a legislature’s own state 
(Glick and Hays 1991). Policy reinvention is an incremental process, with social learning 
occurring as later adopters learn from previous adopters (Rice and Rogers 1980). However, recent 
scholarship demonstrates that certain legislatures contain greater capacity for reinventing policy 
using more original language (Jansa, Hansen, and Gray 2018). 
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Currently, scholars explain a legislature’s ability to use original language in policy reinvention by 
examining the resources available to legislators (Squire 1992; Squire and Moncrief 2015; Jansa, 
Hansen, and Gray 2018). Squire and Moncrief (2015) argue that resources are key factors in 
determining the capacity of legislators to generate and process information, which affect the 
innovative capacity of the legislature. Empirical findings support the idea that institutional 
resources contribute to a legislature’s ability to draft and pass innovative legislation during policy 
reinvention. Jansa, Hansen, and Gray (2018) find that resources impact the likelihood of using 
original language during policy reinvention, an inherently innovative process. 
Although resources are theoretically and empirically linked to legislative innovation, 
resources are not the only factor that influence the legislative capacity for innovation. In addition 
to resources, I contend that the collective characteristics of legislators (e.g. background 
knowledge, past experiences, and personal expertise) play a role in determining the innovative 
capacity of a legislature. I argue that more diverse legislative bodies will demonstrate greater 
innovation in policy reinvention than more homogenous state legislatures.  
This argument is predicated on previous research performed inside and outside of 
political science. The work performed outside of political science is sociological and 
organizational research which analyzed the effects of group heterogeneity on group performance, 
group innovation, and group creativity, with the assumption of diverse groups having the 
opportunity to draw upon a wider pool of experiences, preferences, and expertise (Hoever et al. 
2012; Kippenberg and Hoever 2018; Valls, González‐ Romá, and Tomás 2016). Additionally, 
my argument assumes that the drafting and passage of legislation with original language, 
necessarily relies, in part, on the innovative capacity of the legislature. 
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The Diversity-Innovation Relationship 
Demographic diversity and occupational diversity are similar in the fact that both are 
measured by analyzing the differences between individuals. However, individual demographic 
differences are distinct from occupational differences in a fundamental way. Demographic 
differences are assumed to be associated with differences in knowledge and experience derived 
from distinct group experiences and culture dissimilarity (Janssens and Zanoni 2005), whereas 
occupational differences involve a difference in task-specific skills gained from formal training, 
professional experience, or educational background (Dijk, Engen, and Van Kippenberg 2012). 
The differences in the foundations of demographic diversity and occupational diversity have 
motivated scholarship attempting to measure the effects of one against the other or one in lieu of 
the other. 
The first research into diversity quickly became frustrated with inconsistent findings 
(Dijk, Engen, and van Kippenberg 2012), so researchers turned to analyzing different types of 
diversity in different settings and contexts.  Valls, González‐Romá, and Tomás (2016) studied 
the effects of educational within-group diversity on group performance.  Group performance was 
measured by analyzing “information processing, creative and innovative idea generation and 
problem‐solving, and high‐quality decision‐making (754-56)”.  Valls, González‐Romá, and 
Tomás (2016) found a positive link between group educational diversity and group performance, 
when the group’s innovation climate and quality of communication were high.  Group innovation 
climate and quality of communication were measured via survey, with questions assessing 
perceptions on the group’s acceptance of articulating novel ideas and the fluidity of 
communication.   
Using a multi-agent simulation, Chae, Seo, and Lee (2015) examine how group diversity 
and task complexity impact group creativity.  The authors find that increased group creativity is 
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linked to group diversity when the group is very homogenous or very heterogenous, and group 
creativity is unaffected by middle-levels of diversity.  Further, the simulation demonstrated an 
increase in creativity associated with an increase in task difficulty.  Kristinsson, Candi, and 
Sæmundsson (2016) explore the role of diversity and causal logic in top-management-groups and 
the group’s ability to generate and implement new ideas. Causal logic is a term used to define a 
goal driven group. If a group is driven by causal logic, actions are initiated to reach the consensus 
goal; the only conflict within the group concerns the best means for reaching the goal.  
Within the context of a legislature, the causal logic would be developing comprehensive 
policies to serve the needs of the state. Again, the findings of Kristinsson, Candi, and 
Sæmundsson (2016) are mixed.  Their models show support for greater group diversity increasing 
the likelihood of implementing new ideas and decreasing the generation of new ideas, when the 
group is not driven by causal logic.   
Studies of the relationship between diversity and outcomes, often, show heterogenous 
conclusions. An illustration of these mixed findings is Dijk, Engen, and van Kippenberg’s (2012) 
meta-analysis of diversity-performance and diversity-innovation studies, looking at several types 
of diversity. Initially, the authors find an insignificant relationship between demographic diversity 
and group performance and a mixed relationship between occupation diversity and group 
performance.  
When Dijk, Engen, and van Kippenberg (2012) analyzed the diversity-innovation 
relationship, occupational diversity and demographic diversity were positively related to the 
ability of a group to innovate.  To make sense of these disparate findings, Van Dijk, Van Engen, 
and Van Kippenberg (2012) argue that researchers will not find a direct link between diversity 
and innovation without accounting for quality of communication and a group’s willingness to 
engage with new ideas and alternative solutions. Another recent work supports the proposal of 
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mediating factors affecting the diversity-innovation relationship arguing that previous work 
overlooked the mediating factors of communication and openness (Valls, González‐Romá, and 
Tomás 2016). An in-depth discussion of mediating factors is in a later section. 
Three Measures of Diversity: Occupational, Race/Ethnicity, and Gender 
Research on occupational diversity in state legislatures is limited. The work of Carnes 
(2013) and Carnes and Hansen (2016) approach the issue peripherally. As Carnes (2013) notes, a 
person’s occupation plays a significant role in determining the social class and standing of the 
individual. Because of this link between occupation and social/economic standing, I consider the 
work of Carnes and Hansen (2016), analyzing economic diversity, to capture occupational 
diversity by proxy. 
Carnes and Hansen (2016) examine occupational diversity from an institutional 
perspective, observing which institutional factors contribute to greater economic or occupation 
diversity in state legislatures. According to the authors, legislative professionalism reformers cite 
greater compensation for politicians will allow working class individuals to hold political office, 
because the compensation is great enough for people to forego income earned at their daily 
occupation. Yet, when observing legislator compensation and analyzing economic/occupational 
diversity, Carnes and Hansen (2016) discover that greater compensation of politicians entices 
affluent professionals and deters the working class from running for legislative offices, 
effectively capping occupational diversity. 
In contrast to occupational diversity, gender diversity in legislatures is relatively well-
documented. In an analysis of the role of gender diversity in state legislatures, Berkman and 
O’Conner (1993) display the influence of the representation of women legislators in abortion 
policy and legislation. Traditionally, the mechanism for gender diversity in a legislature 
impacting legislative formulation resides in the traditional theory of differing priorities of men 
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and women, with men emphasizing the importance of economic and business issues and women 
emphasizing the importance of social and familial issues (Berkman and O’Connor 1983). 
However, contemporary research indicates that female legislative preferences do not differ 
significantly from male legislative preferences on issues of family and society (Taylor-Robinson 
and Heath 2003).  The driving mechanism for gender diversity affecting innovation is gender 
interacting with psychological development in the broader context of society generating different 
life experiences for men and women (Chodorow 1978; Gilligan 1982; Ruddick 1989; Skjeie 
1991; Tamerius 1995). 
Racial diversity is the third type of diversity analyzed in this study. Bratton (2002) 
analyzes the impact of greater demographic, racial and gender, diversity in six state legislatures. 
According to Bratton’s model, increasing gender heterogeneity among legislators affiliated with 
the Democratic Party increased the amount of legislation passed pertaining to social and familial 
issues. The findings of Bratton (2002), however, indicate the positive and negative effects of 
legislature heterogeneity.  Bratton’s (2002) models show that the demographic composition of a 
state legislature has an impact on the legislation passed by representatives. When observing 
greater racial diversity in Democratic Parties in state legislatures, Bratton (2002) explains that the 
Republican Party is more likely to pass legislation conflicting with Black interests. Bratton’s 
work, showing that legislative diversity can garner backlash, is an illustrative example of why 
some scholars questioned if diversity could be a double-edged sword. 
Is Diversity a Double-Edged Sword? 
West (2002) warned about excessive group heterogeneity. West (2002) theorized of a 
curvilinear relationship between group heterogeneity and innovation. At one end of the graph, 
where the group is homogenous, individual members will be focused on conforming to the norms 
of the group. On the other end of the spectrum, where the group is very heterogenous, individual 
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members may focus heavily on differences between group members, exacerbating out-group 
biases, having a negative impact on the capacity of a group to act innovatively (West 2002). 
On one side, diversity could invite individual biases which disturb group cohesiveness 
and limit group communication (Williams and O’Reilly 1998). On the other side, diversity 
amalgamates individuals of differing backgrounds, expertise, and experiences which foster group 
performance, innovation and creativity (van Kippenberg and Schippers 2007). With diversity 
appearing to potentially negatively and positively impact innovation, scholars began searching for 
factors that enhance diversity’s benefits. Two factors that either enhance or diminish the 
diversity-innovativeness relationship are quality of communication and open mindedness (Hoever 
et al. 2012; Valls, González‐Romá, and Tomás 2016; Van Dijk, Van Engen, and Van 
Kippenberg 2012). 
Mediating Factors: quality of deliberation and open mindedness 
Hoever et al. (2012), Kearney and Gebert (2009), van Ginkel and van Kippenberg (2008) 
and van Kippenberg and Hoever (2017) identify information elaboration, being directly 
associated with the quality of communication, as the primary mediating variable to reap the 
benefits of diversity in the diversity-innovation relationship. The central concept in information 
elaboration is “the exchange, discussion, and integration of task-relevant information” (van 
Kippenberg and Hoever 2017, 48). 
A crucial part of information elaboration is the willingness of people to engage in 
listening to other perspectives (Hoever et al. 2012). Listening to the perspective of others 
indicates a willingness to meaningfully consider alternative solutions.  In an experimental setting, 
Hoever et al. (2012) found support for the proposition that meaningfully considering alternative 
solutions is key for unlocking the benefits of diversity. According to their findings, only in 
situations where individuals attempted to understand the motivations and considerations of others 
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was the diversity-creativity relationship positive. Closely related to considering alternative 
solutions is open-mindedness, which was found by Pluut and Curşeu (2013) to be an effective 
mediating variable between diversity and innovativeness. 
Valls, González‐Romá, and Tomás (2016) list quality of communication as an important 
mediating variable in the diversity-innovation relationship. When observing the effects of 
educational diversity on performance, without controlling for a setting conducive to quality 
communication, the diversity-innovation interaction was negatively affected. However, when 
adding quality communication as an intervening variable, the diversity-innovation relationship 
was positively affected and statistically significant. To include potential mediating variables in 
the context of state legislatures, I control for state legislature polarization. This does not directly 
test the mediating variables. By controlling for legislature polarization, I hold the potential 
mediating variables constant and test whether increased diversity is associated with increased 
innovation. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
THEORY 
 
Studies of descriptive representation illustrate the importance of diversity in legislative 
deliberation. Deliberation, whether in official channels (e.g. committees, subcommittees) or 
unofficial channels (e.g. in the office of a colleague) provides the environment for differences 
between individual legislators to expand the amount of information and alternative solutions 
which will assist in facilitating innovative drafts of bills and the passage of innovative legislation. 
Although individual studies render mixed results (Jackson, Joshi, and Erhardt, 2003; van 
Knippenberg and Schippers, 2007; Williams & O’Reilly, 1998), a consistently positive 
relationship between diversity, performance, and innovation is uncovered when accounting for 
mediating factors, such as quality of communication, information elaboration, and task 
complexity (Hoever et al. 2012; Valls, González‐Romá, and Tomás 2016).  
When a diverse group of people focus on solving a problem, the pool of information, experience, 
perspective, skill, and knowledge is expansive relative to a homogenous group (Janssens and 
Zanoni 2005; Dijk, Engen, and van Kippenberg 2012). Researchers observe that diversity in the 
private sector increases the capacity of a group to act innovatively (Lorenzo et al. 2017). I explore 
the diversity-innovation connection in the public sphere. I argue that legislative diversity expands 
the pool of information, experience, perspective, skill, and knowledge available to
14 
 
legislators when forming policy solutions. The mechanism by which diversity fosters innovative 
potential is through enhanced deliberation, whether in a formal or informal setting.  Below, I 
discuss the foundational theorists of deliberation and the factors considered to enhance 
deliberation. 
The first modern deliberation theorists drew from the classical works of Aristotle and 
Thomas Aquinas idealistically believing the creation of laws was a process of pure reason, 
insisting that reason unaffected by self-interest was critical to developing effective policy 
(Habermas 1989 [1962]). From the perspective of Habermas, the opening of deliberative 
processes to the working class was detrimental to the process of generating policy without self-
interest, because it deteriorated the homogenous nature of interest which was the driving force of 
reasonable deliberation (Habermas 1989 [1962]. 
Rawls (1971) also pushed for a pure reasoning approach to deliberation. According to 
Rawls (1971), the most effective deliberators are those who rely on reason and logic, who are 
disconnected from their identity and self-interest. The first modern deliberative theorists, 
Habermas and Rawls, determined that the best deliberative bodies were comprised of individuals 
who engaged in “bracketed” deliberation without a sense of self, class, gender, ethnicity, or age 
(Schneiderhan, Khan, and Elrick 2014). Bracketing oneself involves the act of operating without 
a sense of personal identity, and, over time, scholars began to question the value of “bracketing” 
oneself before engaging in deliberation (Mansbridge 2012). I further the school of thought which 
scrutinizes the utility of encouraging individuals to deemphasize their differences, by arguing the 
differences between people enhance the ability of a legislative body to act innovatively.  
Schneiderhan, Khan, and Elrick (2014) explore the idea of ethnic/racial differences 
expanding deliberation and leading to the adaptations of positions. According to the authors, 
whenever a heterogenous group emphasizes their differences, enhanced deliberation, fresh 
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perspectives, and improved communication occurs (Schneiderhan, Khan, and Elrick 2014). The 
primary error of early deliberative theory, as pointed out by Mansbridge (2012), is the assumption 
that a homogenous general interest for society exists. Society is comprised of many interests, and 
the ideal means for ensuring the representation of multiple interests in society is to provide 
bargaining power to different groups (Mansbridge 2012). The idea of incorporating multiple 
interests raises the two fundamental questions: What are the goals of deliberation? And, why are 
the goals of deliberation better met by the inclusion of multiple perspectives in the process of 
deliberation? 
The first goal of deliberation is to determine when a policy will conflict with the interests 
of the polity. I argue that with a less diverse pool of voices potential conflicts with the interest of 
the population are less likely to be discussed. Proponents of substantive representation would 
argue that representatives do not need to have a personal connection to a particular group to 
represent the interests of the group.  However, an accurate representation of diverse interests is 
less easily met by a homogenous legislature (Mansbridge 1999). While representing interests that 
are not necessarily close to one’s own interests is possible, deliberation provides “communicative 
and informational advantages to representatives who are existentially close to the issues” 
(Mansbridge 1999, 636). 
The second goal of deliberation is to develop policy outcomes which are beneficial to the 
entire population, which can be complicated by a homogenous group representing a diverse 
constituency. The third goal of deliberation is to generate commonality and compromise from 
conflictual interests (Mansbridge 1999).  While a homogenous group, in theory, could 
substantively represent conflictual interests to reach a compromise. A legislator being 
existentially close to a policy position serves both the legislator and constituent in that the 
position is sincerely held. While not impossible to meet the goals of deliberation through 
homogenous deliberation, accurately representing the interests of diverse constituents is a 
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considerable task for a homogenous legislature. Therefore, expanding the work of Mansbridge 
(1999), I argue that the three goals of deliberation—determining potential conflicts with interests, 
developing beneficial policy, and generating commonality—are enhanced by the presence of 
multiple perspectives. 
As the goals of deliberation are met by diverse legislative bodies, I expect to observe an 
increased ability to demonstrate greater originality when reinventing policy and less reliance on 
the past policy implementation of other states. Intuitively, when interests are diversely 
represented, the deliberative process is filled with people of differing experiences, background 
knowledge, task-specific skills, and expertise. When different people work together, past research 
demonstrates groups perform with a greater innovative capacity (Dijk, Engen, and van 
Kippenberg 2012). Since this research includes three measures of diversity, I test a hypothesis for 
each diversity measure.   
Diversity Hypothesis – As the diversity (occupational, gender, racial) of a state legislature 
increases, the usage of original language in reinventing policy increases. 
This research also attempts to explore the mediating variables in the diversity-innovation 
relationship. Past scholars demonstrate the effects of group heterogeneity on group performance, 
group innovation, and group creativity (Hoever et al. 2012; Kippenberg and Hoever 2018; Valls, 
González‐Romá, and Tomás 2016). The driving mechanism in this relationship is the wider pool 
of experiences, preferences, and expertise within a diverse group compared to a homogenous 
group. Yet, because research attempted to measure the diversity-innovation dynamic without 
controlling for mediating variables, results appear inconsistent (Dijk, Van Engen, and Van 
Kippenberg 2012; Hoever et al. 2012; van Kippenberg and Hoever 2017). 
Scholars point to two mediating factors, which allow for diverse groups to produce 
innovative solutions: open-mindedness (Homan et al. 2007) and quality of communication and 
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information (Hoever et al. 2012; van Kippenberg and Hoever 2017). Within the public sphere, 
polarization receives blame for several ills affecting the legislative process. According to Barber 
and McCarty (2015), the expanse between policy preferences between politicians of either party 
leads politicians to be less willing to engage with ideas of opposing parties. Additionally, 
increased polarization is linked to brinkmanship, where a politician will push an extreme version 
of a bill, which limits viable compromises available in negotiation (Barber and McCarty 2015; 
McCarty 2007). Because of the effect of polarization on the willingness to engage with new ideas 
and the deleterious impact on the quality of communication, I expect innovativeness to suffer 
whenever a legislative body is more polarized. 
The byproducts of polarization, an unwillingness to engage with opposing preferences 
and brinksmanship (Barber and McCarty 2015; McCarty 2007), I argue act as a proxy for a 
willingness to engage with new ideas and the ability to elaborate on alternatives, which decrease 
the likelihood of diversity leading to innovative behavior.  Therefore, diversity in a legislature 
leads to a greater display of innovation; but, the diversity-innovation relationship is constrained 
by polarization.  
An additional quality of legislative bodies that proves to be a stumbling block for 
collaboration is the institutional influence of the agenda setting power of the majority party 
(Bachrach and Baratz 1962; Cox and McCubbins 2005). Bachrach and Baratz (1962) label the 
ruling elite’s ability to maintain the status quo by only allowing “safe” issues on the agenda the 
Second Face of Power, and Cox and McCubbins (2005) term the agenda setting power of the 
majority party the cartel agenda model. According to the cartel agenda model, the majority party 
in a legislature uses their institutional gatekeeping power to block bills against the status quo, in 
the “majority block-out zone”, from becoming law (Cox and McCubbins 2005). By examining 
majority-party roll-rates in state legislatures, Anzia and Jackman (2012) empirically demonstrate 
a majority-party’s gatekeeping power. By successfully defeating alternative ideas and solutions 
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through expansive gatekeeping rights, stronger majority-party institutional power is associated 
with skirting the alternative ideas central to unlocking diversity’s potential. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The dependent variable is legislative innovation. An area to observe legislative 
innovation is in policy reinvention (Glick and Hays 1991). The process of policy innovation and 
diffusion across the fifty U.S. states provide a well-suited context for measuring legislative 
innovation. After a policy innovator passes legislation, other states will ‘follow-the-leader’ 
drafting legislation covering the same policy area but adapting the exact language of the law to fit 
the needs of their own state (Walker 1969; Rogers 1962; Rogers 1990; Mooney and Lee 1999; 
Jansa, Hansen, and Gray 2018). Often, later adopters of a policy learn from the successes and 
failures of previous adopters, adjust the policy accordingly, and cause laws to become more 
comprehensive over time (Rice and Rogers 1980). 
To determine the level of innovation in policy reinvention, a baseline from which to measure 
innovation must be established. For this research, the previously-passed and most-similar state 
law serves as a baseline for subsequent innovation. For example, Washington passed the first 
state electronic-transaction law in 1996: since no other laws were passed between 1996 and 2000, 
the Washington law serves as the baseline for judging the subsequent wave of reinvention in 
2000.  During the 2000 legislative session, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Maryland, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
20 
 
South Dakota, Utah, and Virginia passed similar laws: these state laws are clustered in the same 
group, because the legislatures passed them the same amount of time from the original innovator 
state and no other state legislatures generated laws in the same policy area.   
To analyze innovation in policy reinvention, I calculate a similarity score for each dyad 
of state laws and place the similarity scores in a matrix.  Figure 1 illustrates the similarity scores 
in matrix form.  The similarity matrix contains the similarity scores for a dyad of state laws.  The 
similarity scores range from 0 to 1, with a score of 0 indicating that the document vectors are 
orthogonal, a right angle, sharing no similarity and a score of 1 indicating perfect similarity. If the 
state laws are identical, such as ‘1 OH (2004).txt’ and ‘1OH(2004).txt’, the similarity score is 1.  
In the Similarity Score Matrix. ‘1OH (2004)’ is a text file of an Ohio law passed in 2004.   
To calculate the amount of innovativeness, I examine the amount of original language 
used in drafting legislation previously adopted in another state.  The columns in Similarity Score 
Matrix. contain a highlighted numeric value that represents the similarity between a state law and 
the most similar state law previously adopted in a different state.  Notice that the “1 OH(2004)” 
law has .916 similarity score with the “CT(2005)”.  However, because the Connecticut law is 
adopted subsequent to the Ohio law, the .916 similarity score is not attributed to the Ohio law.  
Because the “CA(2000)” law occurred before the Ohio law and the similarity score between the 
CA-OH dyad is the highest among the Ohio law and all previous laws, this similarity score is 
used to determine the amount of innovation used by Ohio in drafting this particular law. 
 1OH (2004).txt 1WY (2004).txt AZ (2005).txt CA (2000).txt CT (2005).txt 
1OH (2004).txt 1 0.884869112 0.627289813 0.476003816 0.916239061
1WY (2004).txt 0.884869112 1 0.722919331 0.4360408 0.91035266
AZ (2005).txt 0.627289813 0.722919331 1 0.285736725 0.67457852
CA (2000).txt 0.476003816 0.4360408 0.285736725 1 0.401866702
CT (2005).txt 0.916239061 0.91035266 0.67457852 0.401866702 1
 
Figure 1 - Similarity Score Matrix. 
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Using cosine similarity scores contain several benefits.  First, cosine similarity is easy to 
interpret, with an assigned value falling between 0 and 1: the lower the assigned value, the lower 
the similarity.  Second, cosine similarity is ideal for measuring the similarity of documents of 
different lengths, without confounding the results.  For example, a pair of documents may a high 
dissimilarity score in Euclidean distance simply because of disparate document lengths.  The 
advantage of cosine similarity in this application over Euclidean distance is because Euclidean 
distance uses a count of the common words approach, which measures the magnitude of 
difference between word vectors, and cosine similarity uses multidimensional space to calculate 
the angle between word vectors, which is flexible enough to accommodate comparing documents 
that may not be identical in length. Figure 2. compares cosine similarity and Euclidian distance.  
In Figure 2., the AB line is a vector of words for document ‘B’, and the AC line is a vector of 
words for document ‘C’.  The cosine similarity between the two documents is calculated by 
measuring the angle of the BAC.  The Euclidean distance is measured by calculating the length, 
or magnitude, of the BC line.  Clearly, if a researcher intends to measure document that may be of 
differing lengths, cosine similarity offers the greatest benefits.  
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Figure 2 – Cosine Similarity and Euclidian Distance 
The lower the similarity score, the greater the use of original language, and, I argue, the 
greater the innovation the state legislature displayed. Cosine similarity is calculated by comparing 
angle of the document-feature vectors of two documents (A and B in Equation 1. below). The 
first step in calculating cosine similarity is indexing each of the features, the individual words, of 
the document. The index of a feature is represented by the superscript ‘i’ in Equation 1. When 
fitting the document features into a vector, the features of each document are paired to facilitate a 
similarity score. Next, the first indexed feature of document A is multiplied by the first indexed 
feature of document B. Then, the second feature of document A is multiplied by the second 
feature of document B. And, so on. Finally, the multiplied indices are added together to form the 
numerator of Equation 1. This is known as the dot product of vectors A and B.  
To control for comparing documents of different dimensions (lengths), the dot product 
vectors A and B (the numerator of equation 1.) are divided by the norm matrix, the length of the 
absolute value of documents A and B, of the two documents (the denominator of equation 1).  
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The norm matrix is the term-frequency vector in matrix form.  The formula for calculating cosine 
similarity is found in the Equation 1. 
cosSimA, B =
 ∗ 
||A|| ∗ ||B||
 
Equation 1. – Cosine Similarity 
Bill Text Preprocessing 
Before measuring text similarity, textual preprocessing must occur. The first step in 
preparing for textual comparison is the removal of stop-words, punctuation, numbers, special 
characters, and extra white-space characters. Stop-words are words such as “a”, “the”, “or”, 
“and”, “but”. Stop-words are removed because they do not typically convey additional 
information, and the inclusion of stop-words could cause higher similarity scores between texts 
without the documents being fundamentally more similar. 
While the inclusion of special characters, such as a hashtag, is important for comparing 
data gathered from Twitter, the removal of these characters ensures that likelihood of spurious 
similarity between documents is mediated (Denny and Spirling 2018). The lowercasing of words 
is also performed. By lowercasing words, computational analysis will equate “LOCAL PUBLIC 
HEALTH OFFICIAL” with “local public health official”, which is especially important for the 
analysis of similarity between legal documents.   
The next preprocessing step is the stemming of words. The stemming of words indicates 
that words are reduced to their root word (Porter 1980). The process of stemming words is 
completed because the roots of words represent a broader concept than words with attached 
prefixes or suffixes (Jivani 2011). For example, the words “organizes”, “organizing”, and 
“organize” speak to a broader concept, they are reduced to their root “organiz”. While the dangers 
of under-stemming or over-stemming are a concern, empirical evidence shows that by reducing 
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the “noise” the stemming of words increases the accuracy of comparing and categorizing 
documents, (Denny and Spirling 2018 173). 
Quantifying Textual Data 
To render the bill texts appropriate for quantitative analysis, the words of the bill texts 
must be converted into numerical form. The primary assumption when converting textual data 
into quantitative data is that losing word order is not consequential for analyzation (Grimmer and 
Stewart 2013). This technique is commonly referred to as a “bag of words” representation of a 
text. A simplified example of fitting three documents into a document-feature matrix through the 
quantification of words for cosine similarity calculation is represented in Figure 3. 
Idaho (2006) partial definition of bullying: “intentional written, verbal or physical act” 
New Jersey (2002) partial definition of bullying: “written, verbal or physical act” Georgia (1999) 
partial definition of bullying: “intentional display of force”.  This matrix is used to calculate the 
dot product between two documents, forming the numerator in the cosine similarity equation (see 
Equation 1.). 
 
                        Intentional written verbal Physical Act Display 
Idaho 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Georgia 1 0 0 0 0 1 
New Jersey 0 1 1 1 1 0 
 
In the above scenario, the cosine similarity scores are Idaho-Georgia = .16; Idaho-New Jersey = 
.66; Georgia-New Jersey = 0. 
Figure 3. Document Feature Matrix 
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Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis is state law-legislative session, specifically the dyadic relationship 
between an adopter of a policy and the most similar previously implemented state policy, with 
observations clustered in a legislative session. The analysis covers 101 observations in six 
separate policy areas: Antibullying laws, Public Breastfeeding laws, Employment Non-
Discrimination Act laws, I’m Sorry laws (which prevent physicians from being held liable for 
expressing sympathy for a patient’s medical outcome), Stand Your Ground laws, and E-
Recycling laws. Since the policy areas are common to many states, the opportunity to reinvent 
policy is high, facilitating comparisons across state legislatures. Further, these policy areas 
represent a range of legislative topics and require various amounts of technical knowledge, giving 
the analysis greater robustness. Table 1. contains the adopting states within each policy area. 
Within the antibullying policy area, Arizona, Alaska, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Virginia adopted laws during the 2006-2007 legislative 
session.   
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Table 1. – List of Observations 
Data and Diversity Scores 
The first issue to address when measuring the effect of diversity is determining a measure 
of diversity. Helpfully, the USA Today Diversity Index created by Meyer (1991) is a simple and 
intuitive means for assessing the diversity of a group. USA Today uses census data and the index 
to measure changing demographics in the United States. The index formula is flexible in that a 
diversity score can be calculated for any group with distinct within-group categories. To calculate 
a diversity score using the index, a researcher must adhere to the following steps. First, the group 
must be divisible by two or more categories. Second, each subgroup is represented as a 
proportion of the whole group. Third, the subgroup proportion of the whole group is represented 
as a percentage of the whole, and the percentage is displayed in decimal form. Finally, to 
calculate the probability of selecting two individuals from the whole group from the same 
subgroup, the subgroup proportions, represented as percentages of the whole, are squared, 
Antibullying E-Recycling ENDA I’m Sorry Laws Stand Your Ground Public Breastfeeding
Alaska Connecticut Colorado Arizona Alabama Alabama
Arizona Hawaii Illinois Connecticut Alaska Arizona
Delaware Illinois Iowa Delaware Arizona Arkansas
Florida Maryland Maine Georgia Georgia Colorado
Idaho Michigan Oregon Hawaii Indiana Florida
Indiana Minnesota Pennsylvania Idaho Kansas Kansas
Iowa Missouri Washington Illinois Kentucky Kentucky
Kansas New Jersey Indiana Louisiana Massachusetts
Kentucky North Carolina Iowa Maine Mississippi
Maine Oklahoma Louisiana Michigan New Mexico
Maryland Oregon Maine Mississippi Ohio
Minnesota Rhode Island Maryland North Dakota Oregon
Nebraska South Carolina Missouri Ohio Pennsylvania
Nevada Texas Montana South Carolina Rhode Island
Ohio Virginia Nebraska Tennessee Vermont
Pennsylvania Washington New Hampshire Texas Virginia
South Carolina North Dakota West Virginia Wyoming
Tennessee South Carolina
Texas South Dakota
Utah Utah
Virginia Vermont
Virginia
West Virginia
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summed, and multiplied by 100 (for ease of interpretation). An illustration of the USA Today 
Diversity Index is provided in equation 2. 
 +  +  ∗ 100 =  !"# %&! 
Equation 2. 4 - Diversity Score Formula 
To test the hypothesis that diversity influences a legislature’s ability to demonstrate 
innovation in policy reinvention, I incorporate two measures of diversity, the USA Today 
Diversity Index score and the proportion of legislators not in the majority subgroup. The racial 
diversity score is computed by converting each race/ethnicity subcategory to a proportion of the 
total legislature.  Data for the racial composition of state legislatures in 2006 was compiled by 
Sierra, Hardy-Fanta, Pinderhughes, and Lien (2019) with the Gender and Multicultural 
Leadership Project. The proportion of non-White legislators is used as the alternative measure of 
diversity, since, apart from Hawaii, White legislators comprise a majority of legislators in each 
legislature.   
Similarly, to measure gender diversity in state legislatures, I use two measures. In the 
first measure, I apply the USA Today Diversity Index but replace the racial categories with 
categories for gender to calculate the likelihood of selecting two people of a different gender. 
Data for gender composition of state legislatures for all legislative years is accessible through the 
National Conference of State Legislatures (2018).  Because the composition of state legislatures 
in 2006 is primarily binomial, the second measure uses the proportion of female legislators as a 
representation of gender diversity.  Staying consistent, I measure occupational diversity in two 
ways. One measure uses the proportion of legislators who do not identify as a lawyer or a 
                                                           
4 Each subgroup is represented as a percentage of the whole group.  For example, if a whole group is 
comprised of four subgroups, each consisting of twenty-five percent of the whole group.  The equation 
would be set up as follows: ((.25)^2+ (.25)^2 + (.25)^2 + (.25)^2) * 100 = The liklihood of selecting two 
individual belonging to the same subgroup 
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professional politician, since lawyers and professional politicians comprise the largest 
occupational subgroup. The other measure uses the USA Today Diversity Index.  State legislature 
occupational data for 2007 is accessible through the Carnes and Hansen (2016) study of working- 
class representation in state legislatures.   
Control Variables: Polarization 
The factors mediating the diversity-innovation relationship are quality of communication 
and openness to alternative solutions. Since we currently do not have access to direct measures of 
these characteristics, I use legislature polarization as a proxy. Legislators are less willing to 
engage with alternative solutions whenever the difference in policy preferences is substantial 
(Barber and McCarty 2015). I use Shor’s (2011) ideological mapping of state legislatures to 
measure the level of polarization in each legislature. Shor’s (2011) polarization measurement is 
the premier comprehensive assessment of state legislature polarization and a good variable to 
capture the quality of communication and openness to alternative solutions among and between 
legislators. 
Legislative Professionalism 
When considering levels of professionalization, the time and resources available to each 
member must play a role in the legislative innovativeness of each state. With an extended time to 
deliberate alternative policy solutions, a more professionalized legislature has a greater 
opportunity to generate innovative policy. With a larger staff size, the informational pool for 
policy alternatives is expanded, positively affecting the innovative capacity of the legislature. An 
illustrative example of the differing levels of legislative professionalism, used by Squire and 
Moncrief (2015), are the Wyoming legislature (a less professionalized legislature) and the 
California legislature (a more professionalized legislature). The Wyoming legislature meets 
biennially, once every two years, for sixty-days. The California legislature meets annually for 
around two hundred fifty days over two years. Additionally, the staff of the Wyoming legislator is 
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significantly smaller than the staff of the California legislator. (Squire and Moncrief 2015). 
Because of legislative professionalism’s influence on policy diffusion and policy reinvention, I 
include legislative professionalism in the models by using the Squire Index (Squire 2017) and 
professionalism measures from Bowen and Green (2014). 
Institutional Control 
 Bachrach and Baratz (1962) termed the exclusionary ability of the majority party in a 
legislature the Second Face of Power.  According to Second Face of Power hypothesis, the ruling 
elite, in the context of a state legislature, the majority party, controls the institution to an extent 
that allows only “safe” issues on the agenda. To control for the institutional power of the majority 
party, I include a control variable for majority party roll rates from Anzia and Jackman (2012). 
The majority party roll rate is a good indicator of the majority party’s institutional “block-out” 
power.  A high majority party roll rate indicates that the majority party is unable to block 
alternative ideas and solutions from being placed on the agenda. If the majority party is able to 
block alternative ideas from reaching the agenda, the diversity-innovation relationship is blunted.   
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
FINDINGS 
 
Remember that the relationship between the similarity score to innovation is the same as 
diversity score to legislature diversity but inverse to the proportion non-majority subgroup to 
diversity.  To assist in understanding these relationships, see Figures 4, 5, and 6. Intuitively, using 
the USA Today Diversity Index formula, as the likelihood of selecting two legislators from the 
same subgroup decreases, the diversity within the legislature increases.  If increased racial/ethnic 
diversity is linked to an increase in state legislature innovation, the relationship between the 
variables in the model will be direct – an increase in one will generate an increase in the other. 
 
Similarity Score Lower Score = Greater Innovation 
Race Diversity Score Lower Score = Greater Diversity 
Proportion Non-White  Higher Value = Greater Diversity 
Figure 4. – Racial Diversity Directionality 
 The next variable of interest is the occupational diversity score. Job-related diversity or 
occupational diversity is the diversity metric consistently attributed with increased innovative 
group performance (van Dijk, van Engen, and van Kippenberg 2012). Similar to the measure for 
racial/ethnic diversity, the occupational diversity measure provides the probability of selecting a 
similar legislator. See Figure 5. for an illustration of how the occupational diversity score is
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 related to the diversity of the legislature.   
Similarity Score Lower Score = Greater Innovation 
Occupational Diversity Score Lower Score = Greater Diversity 
Proportion Non-Lawyer/Politician Higher Value = Greater Diversity 
Figure 5. – Occupational Diversity Directionality 
Thus, if increased occupational diversity assists a legislature in using original language in 
reinventing policy, the results will show an inverse relationship and the coefficient will be 
negatively signed.  Directionally, the results indicate support for occupational diversity increasing 
legislative innovation, although the effect of occupational diversity on a state legislature’s use of 
original language when adopting policies from other states is statistically indistinguishable from 
zero.   
Gender diversity is also assessed using two measures.  The first measure is a diversity 
score.  The USA Today Diversity Index formula is used to calculate a gender diversity score.  For 
example, if a legislature is comprised of sixy percent male legislators and forty percent female 
legislators, the formula is set up as follows: ((.6)^2 + (.4)^2)) * 100 = Diversity Score.  To check 
the robustness of the diversity score measure, an alternative measure of gender composition uses 
the proportion of female legislators to determine the gender diversity of a legislature5.  To assist 
in understanding this relationship see Figure 6.  
Similarity Score Lower Score = Greater Innovation 
Gender Diversity Score Lower Score = Greater Diversity 
Proportion Female Legislator Higher Value = Greater Diversity 
Figure 6. – Gender Diversity Directionality 
 The calculated OLS Regression table is located in Figure 7.  Recall the race/ethnicity 
                                                           
5 The gender composition of state legislatures in 2006 is binomial.  Proportion of female legislators will 
not work as a measure of gender diversity as the previous statement becomes less true. 
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hypothesis - The racial/ethnic diversity of a state legislature impacts the usage of original 
language in reinventing policy. Directionally, the results indicate support for racial/ethnic 
diversity decreasing the usage of original language in reinventing policy.  These results however 
do not breach the 95 percent confidence interval.  Therefore, I cannot reject the null hypothesis 
and cannot determine that the impact of racial/ethnic diversity on legislative innovativeness is 
statistically distinguishable from zero.  These findings are not necessarily inconsistent with 
existing theory, however.  According to Homan et al. (2008), if identities are salient but the 
identity of the group is not emphasized, diversity is unlikely to render positive results (Homan et 
al. 2008).  Given our understanding of legislator behavior (Mayhew 1974), it seems unlikely that 
importance is placed on racial/ethnic identity in the legislature or committee as a whole.   
As noted in Figure 7., the models show a statistically significant evidence indicating 
relationship between gender diversity and the borrowing of language from previous policy 
adopters.  As the gender diversity of a legislature increases, the similarity between passed 
legislation and previously adopted legislation decreases – as the gender diversity of the legislature 
increases, the legislature displays greater innovation. 
To ensure the robustness of these findings, I estimate five models.  Controlling for 
legislative professionalism and legislative polarization, the first model shows a statistically 
significant relationship between gender diversity and the usage of original language in policy 
implementation.  These findings support the hypothesis that gender diversity influences a state 
legislature’s innovativeness. 
 Models two and three explore other types of diversity.  Model two examines 
race/ethnicity diversity.  Although the coefficient for racial/ethnic diversity is signed as expected, 
I am unable to reject the null hypothesis.  The results of model two do not support the 
race/ethnicity diversity hypothesis.  Model three contains a variable for occupational diversity.  
Prior studies of diversity and innovation demonstrate a consistent positive link.  Yet, model three 
does not provide support for the occupational diversity hypothesis. 
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 Model four mixes the diversity variables to test the robustness of the gender diversity 
finding.  As noted in Figure 7., the statistical significance is unaltered by the inclusion of 
additional measures of diversity.  In model 5, the most difficult test for the gender diversity 
variable, I also control for the tendency for certain policies to be more heavily copied than others 
by including an indicator variable for each policy. The antibullying law is the excluded reference 
category.  The statistical significance of gender diversity is unimpacted, demonstrating the 
robustness of the finding that the gender composition of a state legislature affects the use of 
original language in policy writing.   
 To get an idea of the size of the effect, an increase in the gender diversity score of a state 
legislature of one unit corresponds with a .5 unit increase in document similarity with policies 
previously adopted in other states.  The gender diversity score has a mean of 65.73 and a standard 
deviation of 7.69.  Thus, an increase of one standard deviation above the average gender diversity 
score results in a 3.85 increase in policy similarity.  Conversely, a decrease of one standard 
deviation from the average gender diversity score returns a 3.85 decrease in policy similarity.  
 The estimated effect size is slightly larger in model eleven, located in Figure 8, with a 
one unit increase in the proportion of female legislators resulting in a .6 decrease in policy 
similarity.  The mean for the proportion of female legislators variable is 22.89 and the standard 
deviation is 7.14.   This shows that increasing the proportion of female legislators by 7.14 
decreases the policy similarity score by 4.28. 
 The reader must be cautioned from overstating the findings of the models in Figure 7 
and Figure 8.  The first sign that the findings may need further exploration is the fact that none 
of the control variables reach statistical significance.  This could indicate that the sampling of 
observations is not a representative sample of the population of policy topics, which generated 
findings not mirrored in the population of observations.  Another limitation of the study is its 
cross-sectional analysis.  While the findings of a cross-sectional study can provide meaningful 
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insight on where to further analyze a phenomenon, future research should expand the 
observations to facilitate a longitudinal analysis. 
Figure 7. OLS Regression Results: Diversity Scores 
 Dependent variable: 
 Similarity Score 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)6 
Gender DS 0.336   0.437** 0.502** 
 (0.206)   (0.214) (0.195) 
Occupation DS  -0.193  -0.264 -0.071 
  (0.276)  (0.289) (0.262) 
Racial DS   0.158 0.167 0.099 
   (0.114) (0.116) (0.105) 
E-recycle     -6.103 
     (4.379) 
ENDA     0.442 
     (5.890) 
I’m Sorry Laws     -8.363** 
     (3.994) 
Public 
Breastfeeding 
    -21.931
*** 
(4.389) 
Stand Your 
Ground 
    -14.859
*** 
(4.386) 
Professionalism -0.233 0.004 -0.209 0.191 -0.192 
 (0.229) (0.444) (0.232) (0.456) (0.411) 
Polarization -1.884 -6.308 -4.548 -2.557 -2.597 
 (4.201) (4.320) (3.796) (4.517) (4.025) 
Maj Party Roll 
Rate 
-0.200 12.813 8.877 3.898 -5.470 
 (21.866) (22.393) (21.311) (22.298) (19.885) 
Constant 46.834*** 73.881*** 59.094*** 25.438 38.720** 
 (17.002) (5.748) (11.506) (20.934) (18.966) 
Observations 101 101 101 101 101 
R2 0.063 0.042 0.056 0.097 0.336 
                                                           
6 A calculation of variance inflator factor (VIF) is performed for model 5.  A VIF is a measure used to 
determine multicollinearity.  If a VIF is over 5, the variable should be removed from the model.  None of 
the variables reached this threshold.  The results of the test are located in the appendix. 
35 
 
Adjusted R2 0.024 0.002 0.017 0.040 0.254 
Residual Std. 
Error 
14.922 (df = 
96) 
15.089 (df = 
96) 
14.978 (df = 
96) 
14.801 (df = 
94) 
13.044 (df = 89) 
F Statistic 
1.613 (df = 4; 
96) 
1.049 (df = 4; 
96) 
1.421 (df = 4; 
96) 
1.689 (df = 6; 
94) 
4.097*** (df = 
11; 89) 
Note: One-
Tailed Test 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
 
Figure 7. and Figure 8. contain several control variables. An index variable for legislative 
professionalism is included in all models and although negatively signed never reaches statistical 
significance. Therefore, this study does not support legislative professionalism significantly 
explains the usage of original language in policy reinvention, which runs counter to previous 
studies of legislative professionalism and policy reinvention. The variable for polarization 
measures the mean ideological distance between conservative and liberal legislators. It is 
theorized that polarization within a legislature creates an environment where legislators are less 
willing to engage with alternative ideas and solutions (Barber and McCarty 2015)7.  
By using alternative measures of diversity, the OLS regression models in Figure 8. serve 
as a robustness check for the findings in Figure 7.  The models in Figure 8. Use the USA Today 
Diversity Index formula to calculate the diversity scores for each of the diversity independent 
variables, while the models in Figure 8. use proportions to measure diversity.  At first blush, the 
results add robustness to the finding that the gender diversity of a state legislature influences its 
ability to innovate when reinventing policy.  Model eight adds robustness to the finding that 
gender diversity in state legislatures influence innovation in policy reinvention.  By using an 
alternative measure of gender diversity in a one-tailed test, we continue to determine that the 
gender diversity of a state legislature has an impact on the innovation of policy during reinvention 
                                                           
7 Models 12-15 include a gender-polarization and a race-polarization interaction.  The models are located 
in the appendix.  Upon interacting the gender and polarization variables, the directionality of the 
coefficient switched to positive.  However, the reduced degrees of freedom and multicollinearity with the 
interaction term causes the effect of gender and polarization to be indistinguishable from zero.  These 
results are similar to the race-polarization interaction.  See appendix for models 12-15. 
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that is discernable from zero.   
The models in Figure 8. generate interest in the race/ethnicity variable.  As indicated by 
model six, a bivariate model with the proportion of non-White legislators acting as the variable of 
interest, the results show that without controlling for other factors, racial/ethnic diversity impacts 
innovating on policy during policy reinvention.  These findings persist at a p-value of .1, when 
controls are included, although statistical significance is diminished when accounting for other 
measures of diversity.  And, in model eleven, the standard error, for the proportion non-White 
variable, is larger than the predicted effect size, indicating that the upper limit of the coefficient, 
in this case, is higher than zero. 
 
 Figure 8. OLS Regression Results: Proportions 
 Dependent variable: 
 SimScore 
 (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Prop non-White 24.284** -22.476*   -16.326 -9.540 
 (12.235) (12.308)   (13.617) (12.077) 
Female Legislators   -0.411*  -0.448** -0.582*** 
   (0.223)  (0.225) (0.205) 
Prop not Law/Pol    0.196 0.162 0.159 
    (0.155) (0.173) (0.153) 
E-recycle      -5.444 
      (4.337) 
ENDA      0.463 
      (5.725) 
I’m Sorry Laws      -8.053** 
      (3.919) 
Public_Breastfeeding      -21.746*** 
      (4.235) 
Stand Your Ground      -15.168*** 
      (4.311) 
Professionalism  -0.216 -0.233 0.199 0.182 0.066 
  (0.229) (0.228) (0.430) (0.456) (0.402) 
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Polarization  -4.821 -1.547 -7.069* -2.995 -3.785 
  (3.761) (4.173) (4.165) (4.409) (3.880) 
Majority Party Roll 
Rate 
 6.059 -0.615 9.379 -2.235 -7.403 
  (21.193) (21.697) (21.358) (21.493) (18.874) 
Constant 66.489*** 75.306*** 77.921*** 56.527*** 66.350*** 80.612*** 
 (2.110) (5.677) (6.135) (14.185) (15.845) (14.299) 
Observations 101 101 101 101 101 101 
R2 0.038 0.069 0.070 0.053 0.110 0.357 
Adjusted R2 0.029 0.031 0.031 0.013 0.053 0.278 
Residual Std. Error 
14.886 (df 
= 99) 
14.871 (df 
= 96) 
14.865 (df 
= 96) 
15.002 (df 
= 96) 
14.700 (df 
= 94) 
12.833 (df = 
89) 
F Statistic 
3.939** (df 
= 1; 99) 
1.788 (df = 
4; 96) 
1.808 (df = 
4; 96) 
1.339 (df = 
4; 96) 
1.928* (df 
= 6; 94) 
4.501*** (df 
= 11; 89) 
Note: One-Tailed Test *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The models show support for gender diversity impacting the innovative capacity of a 
state legislature. As the ratio of female to male legislators near parity, a state legislature’s usage 
of original language in policy reinvention increases. These findings support the theoretical 
reasoning that when aggregated unique group experiences impact the innovative capacity of a 
state legislature, which influences the legislation being produced by the legislature.   
Voters must understand that legislature gender composition is important when heading 
into voting booths. Knowing that gender diversity can impact a state legislature’s policy 
formulation is an important piece of information, when casting a ballot. If policies become more 
comprehensive over time because of policy reinvention, better serving constituents, having a 
diverse legislature that is able to innovate when reinventing policy is critical. Although the 
findings support the gender diversity hypothesis, this study contains theoretical limitations, and I 
am unable to reach incontrovertible theoretical conclusions regarding gender diversity and 
innovation. 
For example, are the models capturing gender diversity’s influence on the innovative 
capacity of a state legislature? Or as a state legislature passes gender parity, and female senators 
and representatives comprise a majority, will the innovative capacity of a state legislature 
continue to increase as the proportion of female representatives increases? Luckily, as of 2019, 
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researchers can empirically investigate a majority female state legislature, with Nevada becoming 
the first state legislature with majority female representation (NCSL 2019).   
It is plausible that the theoretical model of Anzia and Berry (2010) is applicable to the 
findings of this study. Anzia and Berry (2010) find female legislators outperform male legislators, 
with female legislators securing nine percent greater federal funds for their districts than male 
legislators. Additionally, female legislators sponsor and co-sponsor a greater number of bills than 
male legislators (Anzia and Berry 2010). 
 Anzia and Berry argue that the causal mechanism is twofold. First, if voters hold 
conscious or unconscious bias against female candidates, only the most charismatic and gifted 
female politicians gain office. And, second, if female candidates judge the political arena to be 
biased, only the most highly qualified female candidates will seek office (Anzia and Berry 2010). 
The same causal mechanism driving female legislators to outperform male legislators could also 
drive the findings of this study. Future research can delve deeper into why the gender 
composition of legislatures impacts the borrowing of language from other legislatures. 
 This much is clear: as state legislatures near gender parity, the amount of borrowing 
language in policy reinvention is decreased. Future research should attempt to determine if state 
legislatures with greater gender diversity are displaying a greater capacity for innovation because 
of gender diversity or because of an increase female legislators. Assisting in understanding this 
phenomenon, through legislator interviews, future research should work to develop an individual 
model for the diversity-innovation relationship. An individual model will explore when and in 
which contexts individual differences aggregate to link diversity to innovation. 
 Despite the rigorous nature of data collection and analysis in this study, several 
limitations exist.  The lack of a repository for state legislature data restricted the timeframe of this 
study to the 2006-2007 legislative sessions. Abbreviating the timeframe for analysis limited the 
number of observations to slightly over one hundred, which meets the threshold for statistical 
analysis, but could be expanded upon by future research to ensure the robustness of the findings. 
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Using the 2006-2007 legislative sessions contains several advantages.  On the national level, the 
2006-2007 politics looks similar to today. With presidential approval ratings hovering around 
forty percent and the national constituency questioning the foreign policy direction of the nation, 
the 2006-2007 state legislative sessions, as are the state legislative session in 2018-2019, were an 
ideal time for state legislators to feel emboldened to act on behalf of constituents, not simply 
differ to federal direction. Although truncated timeframe limits this study, this research 
establishes the groundwork for future research. 
Future research has the potential to better understand the diversity-innovation link in state 
legislatures. For example, this study analyzes this phenomenon at the state legislature level, 
which results in consequential theoretical limitations. In an attempt to address these limitations, 
future research should also examine within-party diversity. By disaggregating legislator data from 
the legislature to within the party, scholars may reveal that the actual driver of innovation is 
within-party diversity, especially within the majority party, and unique party dynamics cause 
diversity to respond differently for the Republican and Democratic Parties. 
Since the 1990s, in contrast to the Republican Party, the Democratic Party established 
itself as dedicated to the success of female candidates, playing an active role in candidate 
recruitment and support (Elder 2014). With 1,438 Democrat women and 661 Republican women 
serving in state legislatures in 2019 (NCSL 2019), the number of female Democratic state 
legislators compared to the number of female Republican state legislators reflect this effort. If 
scholars observe increased gender diversity associated with increased innovation in both parties, 
such findings would indicate that gender diversity is the main driver of innovation, without 
differences resulting from unique party dynamics. However, if researchers find increased gender 
diversity impacts innovation significantly greater in the Republican Party than the Democratic 
Party, such an observation would support the theoretical construct of Anzia and Berry (2010) 
which posits that female legislators will outperform male legislators because of societal bias 
toward selecting women to serve in legislative positions.  
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Additionally inspiring to the exploration of within-party gender diversity, scholarship 
identifies polarization from ideological sorting, with women seeing fewer successes in 
conservative areas (Norrander and Wilcox 2005), and the realignment over the role of women in 
society, with the Democratic Party championing the benefits of female state legislative 
representation (Elder & Greene, 2012, Chapter 3) as significant, divergent party dynamics. 
Examining the diversity-innovation relationship in these different contexts can serve to parse out 
the contexts that support the diversity-innovation phenomenon and the contexts that require the 
female candidates to overcome social biases which result in higher performance once in office. 
Further research can also implement different operationalizations of innovation. This 
study operationalized innovation by exploiting policy reinvention. However, scholars can see if 
diversity impacts the likelihood of being an early policy adopter or being the innovator state a 
policy area. The avenues for future research are many and the study of this relationship is open 
for exploration from many angles. Two angles come readily to mind. First, scholars should 
analyze diversity among party leadership, especially the majority party, to see in diversity in party 
leadership sparks greater innovation. Second, scholars should explore committee compositions, to 
examine if deliberation is enhanced by greater diversity, with the views of society substantively 
represented. 
 In closing, this research is impactful for several reasons. First, the finding that gender 
diversity is associated with the less borrowing of language in policy reinvention is important for 
voters to understand. Generally, citizens want their state governments to draft legislation to fit the 
needs of their state. If a state legislature is homogenously gendered, these findings indicate that 
the legislature will have a tougher time drafting original legislation, which is arguably the reason 
for having governmental institutions “closer” to the people. If citizens understand that gender 
diversity is important to the formulation of original legislation and original policy reinvention, a 
conscientious, well-informed voter can provide their legislature with the additional capacity to 
innovate for the wellbeing of the state. 
42 
 
 Second, the finding that gender diversity is associated with less borrowing of language in 
policy reinvention is impactful for political parties. When political parties make decisions about 
whom to run for office, the knowledge of the benefits of a legislative body with a balance of male 
and female legislators should influence their calculus. Additionally, if the majority party within 
the legislature possessed the institutional power to determine committee composition, 
understanding the benefits of gender diversity could unlock the potential for greater innovation in 
a committee setting. 
 Third, these findings are important for society. If greater gender diversity unlocks the 
innovative potential of a state legislature, the proposition of gender diversity unlocking 
innovation in other areas is encouraging. Fourth, these findings are impactful for achieving 
comprehensive legislation. If changes to policy through policy reinvention is crucial to generating 
more comprehensive policy (Mooney and Lee 1999) and different compositions of legislators 
innovate at higher levels, society can achieve more comprehensive policy by increasing the 
gender diversity of state legislatures. And, finally, this study demonstrates that descriptive 
representation also contains substantive benefits. As state legislatures more closely descriptively 
reflect the populations they represent, we should observe an increased capacity for innovation. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Diversity Interaction with Polarization 
 Dependent variable: 
 SimScore 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Prop non-male*Polarization 0.122    
 (0.479)    
Prop non-white*Polarization  16.471   
  (33.015)   
Gender DS*Polarization   -0.156  
   (0.483)  
Race DS * Polarization     -0.222 
    (0.259) 
Prop non-male Legislators -0.747 0.578***   
 (0.674) (0.206)   
Gender DS   0.705 0.515** 
   (0.659) (0.196) 
Polarization -6.758 -5.769 7.300 15.310 
 (12.266) (5.568) (30.922) (21.264) 
Prop non-white -9.611 -31.739   
 (12.144) (46.121)   
Prop non-Law/Pol 0.154 0.141   
 (0.155) (0.158)   
Race DS   0.101 0.423 
   (0.106) (0.392) 
ODS   -0.071 -0.039 
   (0.264) (0.265) 
E-recycle -5.567 -5.288 -6.232 -5.762 
 (4.386) (4.366) (4.419) (4.403) 
ENDA 0.266 0.737 0.193 0.880 
 (5.807) (5.776) (5.970) (5.921) 
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I’m Sorry Laws -8.101** -7.876** -8.423** 8.167** 
 (3.944) (3.951) (4.018) (4.006) 
Public Breastfeeding -21.947*** 22.096*** 22.154*** 22.461*** 
 (4.329) (4.311) (4.465) (4.439) 
Stand Your Ground -15.257*** 15.259*** 14.943*** 15.055*** 
 (4.347) (4.333) (4.416) (4.399) 
Professionalism 0.059 0.026 -0.182 -0.234 
 (0.405) (0.412) (0.414) (0.415) 
Maj. Party Roll Rate -6.736 -9.125 -4.604 -8.744 
 (19.152) (19.266) (20.165) (20.277) 
Constant 85.011*** 85.068*** 25.395 11.947 
 (22.420) (16.911) (45.461) (36.540) 
Observations 101 101 101 101 
R2 0.358 0.359 0.337 0.342 
Adjusted R2 0.270 0.272 0.247 0.252 
Residual Std. Error (df = 
88) 
12.901 12.888 13.110 13.064 
F Statistic (df = 12; 88) 4.088*** 4.112*** 3.726*** 3.806*** 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Multicollinearity Test: Model 5 
 GVIF Df GVIFDf)) 
Gender DS 1.519 1 1.233 
Race DS 1.161 1 1.078 
Occupation DS 4.867 1 2.206 
factor(Bill_Classification) 1.347 5 1.030 
Professionalization  4.623 1 2.150 
Polarization 1.607 1 1.268 
Majority Party Roll Rate 1.217 1 1.103 
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